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ABSTRACT
The property of proportional representation in approval-based committee elections has appeared in
the social choice literature for over a century, and is typically understood as avoiding the underrepre-
sentation of minorities. However, we argue that the security of some distributed systems is directly
linked to the opposite goal of avoiding the overrepresentation of any minority, a goal not previ-
ously formalized which leads us to an optimization objective known as maximin support, closely
related to the axiom of proportional justified representation (PJR). We provide a new inapproxima-
bility result for this objective, and propose a new election rule inspired in Phragmén’s methods that
achieves a) a constant-factor approximation guarantee for the objective, and b) the PJR property.
Furthermore, a structural property allows one to quickly verify that the winning committee satisfies
the two aforementioned properties, even if the algorithm was executed by an untrusted party who
only communicates the output. Finally, we present an efficient post-computation that, when paired
with any approximation algorithm for maximin support, returns a new solution that a) preserves the
approximation guarantee, b) satisfies PJR, and c) can be efficiently verified to satisfy PJR.
Our work is motivated by an application on blockchains that implement nominated proof-of-stake
(NPoS), where the community must elect a committee of validators to participate in its consensus
protocol, and where fighting overrepresentation protects the system against attacks by an adver-
sarial minority. Our election rule enables a validator election protocol with formal and verifiable
guarantees on security and proportionality. We propose a specific protocol that can be successfully
implemented in spite of the stringent time constraints of a blockchain architecture, and that will be
the basis for an implementation in the Polkadot network, launched in 2020.
Keywords social choice · approval-based committee election · approximation algorithms · proof-of-stake · blockchain
1 Introduction
The property of proportional representation in approval-based committee elections has been discussed in the literature
of computational social choice for a long time, with new mathematical formulations recently proposed to formalize it.
The property is typically understood as ensuring that no minority in the electorate is underrepresented by the winning
committee. In this paper we complement this notion with an analysis of the opposite goal: fighting overrepresentation
of any minority. We establish such objective formally as an optimization problem, related to the axiom of proportional
justified representation (PJR), and propose efficient approximation algorithms for it.
Our work is motivated by the problem of electing participants to the consensus protocol – whom we refer to as
validators – in a decentralized blockchain network, where overrepresentation may affect security. More precisely,
under a proof-of-stakemechanism it is assumed that a majority of the native token is in the hands of honest actors, and
this proportion of honest actors is to be preserved among the elected validators; hence, if the validator committee is
selected via an election process where users have a vote strength proportional to their token holdings, an adversarial
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minority should not be able to gain overrepresentation. We propose an efficient election rule for the selection of
validators which offers strong guarantees on security and proportional representation, and successfully adapts to the
distributed and resource-limited nature of blockchain protocols.
Background on Nominated Proof-of-Stake. Many blockchain projects launched in recently years substitute the inef-
ficient proof-of-work (PoW) component of Nakamoto’s consensus protocol [14] with proof-of-stake (PoS), which is
much more efficient and offers security in the presence of a dishonest minority of users, where this minority is to be
measured relative to token holdings. We focus on nominated proof-of-stake (NPoS), a variant of PoS where at regular
intervals a committee of validators is elected by the community to participate in the consensus protocol. Users are free
to become validator candidates, or become nominators, who approve of candidates that they trust and back them with
their tokens. Both validators and nominators thus put their tokens at stake and receive economic rewards (coming from
transaction fees and minting of new tokens) on a pro-rata basis, and may also be penalized in case a validator shows
negligent or adversarial behavior. Polkadot [6] is a blockchain network launched in 2020 which implements NPoS.
Having the nominator role in the system allows for a massive number of users to indirectly participate in the consen-
sus protocol, in contrast to the number of elected validators which due to operational limitations remains bounded,
typically in the order of hundreds. This allows for a large amount of stake to back validators, much higher than any
single user’s holding. Intuitively, the higher the stake backing the validators, the higher the security of the network;
we make this intuition formal further below. As such, one of the goals of the validator election rule is to maximize
the stake backing all elected validators. The second, equally important goal is proportionality, i.e. picking a commit-
tee where nominators are represented in proportion to their stake. We highlight that diverse preferences and factions
will naturally arise among nominators for reasons that range from economic and technical to political, geographical,
etc. Such diversity of points of view is expected and welcome in a distributed system, and having a committee with
proportionality guarantees helps keep the system decentralized and its users satisfied.
Proportional representation in multiwinner elections. Let us now formalize this validator election and its two stated
goals. For simplicity, we consider that only nominators have stake, not candidates, and that a nominator’s approval
of candidates is dichotomous, i.e. she provides an unranked list of approved candidates of any size. This leads a to
vote-weighted, approval-based committee election scheme. There are finite sets N and C of voters (nominators) and
candidates respectively, and every voter n ∈ N provides a list Cn ⊆ C of approved candidates and has a vote strength
sn (their stake). There is also a target number 1 ≤ k < |C| of candidates to elect.
One of our goals corresponds to the classical notion of proportional representation, i.e. the committee should represent
each group in the electorate proportional to their aggregate vote strength, with no minority being underrepresented.
Electoral system designs that achieve some version of proportional representation have been present in the literature of
social choice for a very long time. Of special note is the work of Scandinavian mathematicians Edvard Phragmén and
Thorvald Thiele in the late nineteenth century [17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 12]. Several axioms have been recently proposed
to define the property mathematically; we mention the most relevant ones. Justified representation (JR) [2] states
that if a group N ′ ⊆ N of voters is cohesive enough in terms of candidate preferences and has a large enough
aggregate vote strength, then it has a justified claim to be represented by a member of the committee. Proportional
justified representation (PJR) [21] says that such a groupN ′ deserves not just one but certain number of representatives
according its vote strength, where a committee member is said to represent the group as long as it represents any voter
in it. Finally, extended justified representation (EJR) [2] strengthens this last condition and requires not only that N ′
have enough representatives as a group, but some voter in it must have enough representatives individually. It is known
that EJR implies PJR, and PJR implies JR, but converse implications are not true [21]. For each of these properties,
we say that a committee voting rule satisfies said property if its output committee is always guaranteed to satisfy the
property for any input instance. While the most common voting rules usually satisfy JR, they fail to satisfy the stronger
properties of PJR and EJR, and up to recently there were no known efficient voting rules that satisfy the latter two.
For instance, the proportional approval voting (PAV) method [24, 12] proposed by Thiele satisfies EJR but is NP-hard
to compute, while efficient heuristics based on it, such as reweighted approval voting, fail PJR [4, 23, 2]. Only very
recently have efficient algorithms that achieve PJR or EJR finally been proposed [5, 22, 3, 16].
Among these axioms, we set to achieve PJR, defined formally in Section 2, for two reasons. First, because it is more
Sybil resistant [7] than JR, meaning that a strategic voter may be incentivized to assume several nominator identities in
the network under JR, but not under PJR. Second, because PJR seems to be most compatible with our security objective.
Indeed, as argued in [16] and [13], the PJR and EJR axioms correspond to different notions of proportionality: while
EJR is primarily concerned with the general welfare or satisfaction of the voters, PJR considers proportionality of the
voters’ decision power, and our security objective aligns with the latter notion as we explain below.
The security goal: fighting overrepresentation. In a PoS-based consensus protocol, we want a guarantee that as long
as most of the stake is in the hands of actors that behave honestly or rationally, carrying any attack will be very costly.
If we assume that the attack requires control of some minimum number of validators to succeed, the adversary would
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need to use its stake to get these validators elected. The security level is hence proportional to how difficult it is for an
entity to gain overrepresentation in the validator election protocol. Interestingly, this is in stark contrast to the classical
approach taken in proportional representation axioms, that only seek to avoid underrepresentation.
Recall that each voter n ∈ N has a vote strength sn and a list of approved candidates Cn ⊆ C. Suppose we want
to make it as expensive as possible for an adversary to gain a certain number 1 ≤ r ≤ k of representatives into
the k-validator committee, and that few to none of the honest nominators trust these candidates. Then, our goal
would be to elect a committee A ⊆ C that maximizes minA′⊆A,|A′|=r
∑
n∈N : Cn∩A′ 6=∅
sn. This gives a different
objective for each value of threshold r. For example, for r = 1, maximizing this objective is equivalent to the classical
multiwinner approval voting: selecting the k candidates c ∈ C with highest total approval
∑
n∈N : c∈Cn
sn. If we are
only concerned about a particular threshold, e.g. r = ⌈(k+1)/3⌉ for a 34% attack1, then we can fix the corresponding
objective. However, different types of attacks require different thresholds, and some attacks succeed with higher
probability with more attacking validators. Hence, a more pragmatic approach is to incorporate the threshold into the
objective and maximize the least possible per-validator cost over all thresholds, i.e.
Maximize min
A′⊆A,A′ 6=∅
1
|A′|
∑
n∈N : Cn∩A′ 6=∅
sn, over all committees A ⊆ C with |A| = k. (1)
We establish in Lemma 6 that this objective is equivalent to the maximin support objective, recently introduced by
Sánchez-Fernández et al. [22], and which we thus set to optimize. We define it formally in Section 2. The authors
in [22] remark that in its exact version, maximin support is equivalent to another objective, maxPhragmen, devised
by Phragmén and recently analyzed in [5], and in this last paper it is shown that maxPhragmen is NP-hard and
incompatible with EJR. Thus, the same hardness and incompatibility with EJR holds true for our security objective.
To the best of our knowledge, the approximability of maximin support has not previously been studied.
Our contribution. Our security analysis in the election of validators leads us to pursue the goal of fighting overrepre-
sentation, andmore specifically to the maximin support objective. Conversely, we formalize our goal of proportionality
to the PJR property, which fights underrepresentation. We show in this paper that these two objectives complement
each other well, and prove the existence of efficient election rules that achieve guarantees for both objectives.
Theorem 1. There is an efficient election rule for approval-based committee elections that simultaneously achieves
the PJR property and a 3.15-factor approximation guarantee for the maximin support objective.
Our proposed election rule is inspired in the seqPhragmenmethod [5], and to the best of our knowledge corresponds
to the first analysis of approximability for a Phragmén objective. In contrast, several approximation algorithms for
Thiele objectives have been proposed; see [13] for a survey. Our optimization approach to proportional representation
also provides new tools to discern between different election rules. For instance, MMS [22] and seqPhragmen [5]
are two efficient rules that achieve the PRJ property, but we show that while the former provides a constant-factor
approximation guarantee for maximin support, the latter does not (Section 3). Next comes the question of applicability:
the blockchain architecture adds very stringent time constraints to computations, and may render all but the simplest
algorithms unimplementable.2 This is because, in order to reach consensus on a protocol, validators typically need to
execute it individually, and no further blocks can be produced until most validators finish the computation and agree
on the output. However, if an output can be verified much faster than it can be computed, then it is possible to dump
the computation to off-chain workers, who execute it privately and separately from block production, leaving only the
output verification task to validators. This is the case for our election rule.
Theorem 2. There is a linear-time test that takes as input an election instance and an arbitrary solution to it, such
that if the test passes then the input solution satisfies the PJR property and a 3.15-factor approximation guarantee for
the maximin support objective. Moreover, the output of the election rule mentioned in Theorem 1 always passes this
test.
We believe this to be the most important feature of our proposed election rule relative to others in the literature. Such
efficient verification helps ensure transparency in a decentralized governance process, and might be of independent
interest. In the context of our motivating application, it makes our election rule implementable into a fast blockchain
validator election protocol which provides strong and verifiable guarantees on security and proportionality. We provide
details on such a protocol in Section 6, which will be the basis for an implementation in the Polkadot network. Finally,
1This is the minimum threshold required to carry on a successful attack in classical Byzantine fault tolerant protocols [15].
2For instance, the PoS-based project EOS uses multiwinner approval voting to elect a validator committee, which is a highly
efficient election rule but is known to perform poorly in terms of proportionality. This has lead to user dissatisfaction and claims
of excessive centralization. For an analysis, we refer to the blogpost “EOS voting structure encourages centralization” by Priyeshu
Garg at https://cryptoslate.com/eos-voting-structure-encourages-centralization/
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we derive from the new election rule a post-computation which, when paired with any approximation algorithm for
the maximin support problem, makes it also satisfy PJR in a black-box manner.
Theorem 3. There is an efficient computation that takes as input an election instance and an arbitrary solution to it,
and outputs a new solution which a) is no worse than the input solution in terms of the maximin support objective, b)
satisfies the PJR property, and in particular c) can be efficiently tested to satisfy the PJR property.
Organization of the paper. We start with a thorough complexity analysis of the maximin support problem in Section 3,
where we exhibit several approximation algorithms for it, and prove as well that it does not admit a PTAS3 unless
P=NP so constant-factor approximations are best possible. Interestingly, many of our approximation analyses are
based on network flow theory. In Section 4 we propose a new heuristic, Phragmms, inspired in seqPhragmen [5]
but allowing for a more robust analysis and better guarantees than the latter both in terms of the PJR property and the
maximin support objective. We use it to prove Theorem 1 and obtain the fastest known algorithm that simultaneously
guarantees a) the PJR property and b) a constant-factor approximation for maximin support.
In Section 5 we prove Theorems 2 and 3, and explore how the two aforementioned guarantees can be efficiently tested
by a verifier, even if the algorithm is privately executed by an untrusted prover who only communicates the solution.
To do so, we define a parametric version of the PJR property, and a notion of local optimality for solutions. Finally,
in Section 6 we propose a validator election protocol for an NPoS-based blockchain network, where we exploit our
results. This proposal will be the basis for an implementation in Polkadot.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper we consider the following approval-basedmultiwinner election instance. We are given a bipartite
approval graph G = (N ∪ C,E) where N is a set of voters and C is a set of candidates. We are additionally given a
vector s ∈ RN≥0 of vote strengths, where sn is the strength of n’s vote, and a target number k of candidates to elect,
where 0 < k < |C|. For each voter n ∈ N , Cn := {c ∈ C : nc ∈ E} represents her approval ballot, i.e. the subset of
candidates that n approves of, and for each candidate c ∈ C we denote byNc := {n ∈ N : nc ∈ E} the set of voters
approving c, where nc is shorthand for edge {n, c}. To avoid trivialities, we assume that graph G in the input has no
isolated vertices. For any c ∈ C \A, we write A+ c and A− c as shorthands for A ∪ {c} and A \ {c} respectively.
Proportional justified representation (PJR). The PJR property was introduced in [21] for voters with unit vote strength.
We present its natural generalization to arbitrary vote strengths. A committee A ⊆ C of k members satisfies PJR if
there is no groupN ′ ⊆ N of voters and integer 0 < r ≤ k such that:
a)
∑
n∈N ′
sn ≥
r
k
∑
n∈N
sn, b) | ∩n∈N ′ Cn| ≥ r, and c) |A ∩ (∪n∈N ′Cn)| < r.
In words, if there is a group N ′ of voters with at least r commonly approved candidates, and enough aggregate vote
strength to provide each of them with a vote support of value tˆ :=
∑
n∈N sn/k, then this group has a justified right to
be represented by at least r members in committee A, though not necessarily commonly approved. Notice that tˆ is an
upper bound on the average vote support that voter set N can possibly provide to any committee of k members.
Maximin support objective. For the given instance, we consider a solution consisting of a tuple (A,w), where A ⊆ C
is a committee of k elected candidates, and w ∈ RE≥0 is a vector of non-negative edge weights that represents a
fractional distribution of each voter’s vote among her approved candidates.4 For instance, for voter n this distribution
may assign a third of sn to c1 and two thirds of sn to c2, where c1, c2 ∈ Cn. Vector w is considered feasible
5 if∑
c∈Cn
wnc ≤ sn for each voter n ∈ N. (2)
In our analyses, we will also consider partial committees, with |A| ≤ k. If |A| = k, we call it full. All solutions
(A,w) in this paper are assumed to be feasible and full unless stated otherwise. Given a (possibly partial, unfeasible)
solution (A,w), we define the support over the committee members as
suppw(c) :=
∑
n∈Nc
wnc for each c ∈ A, and suppw(A) := min
c∈A
suppw(c), (3)
3A polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for an optimization problem is an algorithm that, for any constant ε > 0 and
any given instance, returns a (1 + ε)-factor approximation in polynomial time.
4This weight vector is related to the notions of support distribution function in [22] and price system in [16]. In particular, all
voting rules considered in this paper are priceable, as defined in [16].
5Intuitively, a feasible solution (A,w) should also observe wnc = 0 for each edge nc with c 6∈ A. However, as this constraint
can always be enforced in post-computation, we ignore it so that the feasibility of a vector w is independent of any committee.
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where we use the convention that suppw(∅) = ∞ for any weight vector w ∈ RE≥0. The maximin support objective,
introduced in [22], asks to maximize the least member support suppw(A) over all feasible full solutions (A,w).
Balanced solutions. For a fixed committee A, a feasible weight vector w ∈ RE≥0 that maximizes suppw(A) can be
found efficiently. In this paper we seek additional desirable properties on a weight vector which can still be achieved
efficiently. We say that a feasible w ∈ RE≥0 is balanced for A, or that (A,w) is a balanced solution, if
1. it maximizes the sum of member supports,
∑
c∈A suppw(c), over all feasible weight vectors, and
2. it minimizes the sum of supports squared,
∑
c∈A(suppw(c))
2, over all vectors that observe the point above.
In other words, a balanced weight vector maximizes the sum of supports and then minimizes their variance. In the
next lemma, whose proof is delayed to Appendix E, we establish some key properties that we exploit in our analyses.
Lemma 4. Let (A,w) be a balanced, possibly partial solution. Then,
1. for each 1 ≤ r ≤ |A|, vector w simultaneously maximizes minA′⊆A,|A′|=r
∑
c∈A′ suppw′(c) over all
feasible weight vectors w′ ∈ RE≥0;
2. for each voter n ∈ ∪c∈ANc, it must hold that
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc = sn; and
3. for each voter n ∈ ∪c∈ANc and each candidate c ∈ A ∩ Cn with wnc > 0, it must hold that suppw(c) =
suppw(A ∩Cn) := minc′∈A∩Cn suppw(c
′).
Furthermore, a feasible solution (A,w) is balanced if and only if it observes properties 2 and 3 above.
Notice that by setting r = 1 on the first point, we obtain that balanced vector w indeed maximizes the least member
support suppw(A) over all feasible weight vectors. More generally, for each r the quantity defined in the first point
defines a lower bound on the cost for an adversary to get r representatives in the validator committee in NPoS, so
maximizing these objectives for all thresholds r aligns with our security objective as it makes any attack as costly as
possible. The second point follows from the fact that the sum of member supports is maximal, so all the available
voters’ vote must be distributed to candidates in A. The third point is a consequence of having the supports as evenly
distributed as possible within A: if c, c′ ∈ A ∩ Cn and candidate c has a higher support than c′, then none of n’s vote
can go to c, as all of it must be assigned to c′ or other members with low support.
In Appendix A we present new algorithms for computing a balanced weight vector for a given committee A. In
particular, we prove that one can be found in time O(|E| · k + k3) using parametric flow techniques, which to the
best of our knowledge is the current fastest algorithm in the literature even for the simpler problem of maximizing
suppw(A).
Remark 5. In the remainder of the paper, we denote by Bal the time complexity of finding a balanced weight vector,
which will depend on the precise algorithm used.
Equivalence of objectives. We now establish that our security objective (1) is indeed equivalent to maximin support.
For this we use the fact that, in view of point 1 in Lemma 4, in the maximin support objectivewe can reduce the solution
space to only balanced solutions without loss of generality. The proof of the next lemma is delayed to Appendix E.
Lemma 6. If (A,w) is a balanced solution, then
suppw(A) = min
∅6=A′⊆A
1
|A′|
∑
n∈∪c∈A′Nc
sn.
Consequently, maximin support, the problem of maximizing the left-hand side over all balanced full solutions (A,w), is
equivalent to the problem of maximizing the right-hand side over all full committees A. Furthermore, this equivalence
preserves approximations, as any balanced solution (A,w) provides the same objective value to both problems.
Network flows. In many proofs we deal with a vector f ∈ RE of edge weights over the input graph G = (N ∪ C,E),
which we regard as a vector of flows with positive signs considered to be flow directed toward C, and negative signs
as flow directed toward N . Consequently, the excess of a voter n ∈ N relative to f is f(n) :=
∑
c∈Cn
fnc, and the
excess of a candidate c ∈ C is f(c) := −
∑
n∈Nc
fnc. A set of vertices S ⊆ N ∪C has net excess if
∑
x∈S f(x) > 0,
and it has net demand if
∑
x∈S f(x) < 0. A vector f
′ ∈ RE is a sub-flow of f if a) for each edge e ∈ E with f ′e 6= 0,
flows f ′e and fe have the same sign and |f
′
e| ≤ |fe|, and b) for each vertex x ∈ N ∪ C with f
′(x) 6= 0, excesses f ′(x)
and f(x) have the same sign and |f ′(x)| ≤ |f(x)|. The proof of the next lemma is delayed to Appendix E.
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Lemma 7. If weight vectors w,w′ ∈ RE≥0 are non-negative and feasible for the given instance, and f
′ ∈ RE is a
sub-flow of f := w′ − w, then both w + f ′ and w′ − f ′ are non-negative and feasible as well.
Remark 8. In all algorithms analyzed, we assume that all numerical operations take constant time.
3 Complexity results for maximin support
Consider an instance (G = (N ∪ C,E), s, k) of a multiwinner election as defined in Section 2. In this section we
present an analysis of the complexity of the maximin support problem, including new results both on approximability
and on hardness. As our ultimate goal is to develop efficient algorithms that provide guarantees for both the PJR
property and the maximin support problem, we also comment on how the relevant heuristics in the literature of the
former objective fare for the latter.
The maximin support problem was introduced in [22], where it was observed to be NP-hard. We start by showing a
stronger hardness result for this problem, which rules out the existence of a PTAS.
G′ = (V ′, E′) G = (N ∪ C,E)
Figure 1: Reduction of an instance of the the k-independent set problem on cubic graphs to an instance of the maximin
support problem. Set N of voters is represented by triangles and set C of candidates by circles.
Lemma 9. For any constant ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate the unweighted maximin support problem within a
factor of α = 1.2− ε.
Proof. We present a reduction from the k-independent set problem on cubic graphs, which is known to be NP-hard [9].
In this problem, one is given a graph G′ = (V ′, E′) where every vertex has degree exactly 3, and a parameter k′, and
one must decide whether there is a vertex subset I ⊆ V ′ of size k′ such that no two vertices in I are adjacent, i.e. I is
an independent set. Given such an instance, we define an instance (G = (N ∪ C,E), s, k) of maximin support where
k = k′, C = V ′ (each vertex in V ′ corresponds to a candidate), and N = E′ with sn = 1 and Cn = n for each
n ∈ N (each edge in E′ corresponds to a voter with unit vote that approves of the two candidates on its endpoints);
see Figure 1. Notice that in this instance, each candidate is approved by exactly 3 voters, and two candidates c, c′ have
an approving voter in common if and only if c and c′ are adjacent in V ′.
Hence, if there is an independent set I of size k in G′, the same committee of validators in G can be assigned the full
vote of each of its three approving voters, so that each receives a support of 3 units, which is clearly maximal. On the
other hand, if there is no independent set of size k inG′, then for any solution (A,w) of the maximin support instance
there must be two committee members c, c′ ∈ A who have an approving voter in common. These two members have
at most five voters approving either of them, so one of them must have a support of at most 5/2. This shows that
suppw(A) ≤ 5/2 for any feasible solution (A,w). Finally, notice that the ratio between the objective values 3 and
5/2 is 6/5 = 1.2 > α, so the assumed α-approximation algorithm for maximin support would allow us to distinguish
between these two cases and decide whether such an independent set I exists. This completes the proof.
The seqPhragmen heuristic [5] achieves the PJR property and is very fast, with a running time ofO(|E| ·k). However,
in Apendix B we prove that it does not offer a constant-factor approximation for the maximin support problem.
Lemma 10. For the maximin support problem, the approximation ratio offered by seqPhragmen is no better than the
k-th harmonic numberHk :=
∑k
i=1 1/i = Θ(log k).
In contrast, we prove next thatMMS [22], which also achieves the PJR property, provides a 2-factor approximation for
maximin support, although with a considerably slower runtime ofO(Bal ·|C| · k), where we recall that Bal is the time
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complexity of computing a balanced weight vector; see Remark 5. In simple terms, MMS (Algorithm 1) starts with
an empty committee A and adds to it one candidate throughout k iterations; in each iteration, it computes a balanced
weight vector for each possible augmented committee that can be obtained from adding an unelected candidate, and
then inserts the candidate whose corresponding augmented committee has the highest least member support.
Data: Bipartite approval graphG = (N ∪C,E), vector s of vote strengths, target committee size k.
Initialize A = ∅ and w = 0 ∈ RE≥0;
for i = 1, 2, · · · k do
for each c ∈ C \A do Compute a balanced6 edge weight vector wc for A+ c;
Find ci ∈ argmaxc∈C\A suppwc(A+ c);
Update A← A+ ci and w ← wci ;
end
return (A,w);
Algorithm 1:MMS, proposed in [22]
Theorem 11. TheMMS algorithm provides a 2-approximation for maximin support.
We will need the following technical result, whose proof is delayed momentarily.
Lemma 12. If (A∗, w∗) is an optimal solution to the given instance of maximin support, and (A,w) is a partial
solution with |A| ≤ k and A 6= A∗, then there is a candidate c′ ∈ A∗ \ A and a feasible solution (A + c′, w′) such
that
suppw′(A+ c
′) ≥ min
{
suppw(A),
1
2
suppw∗(A
∗)
}
.
Proof of Theorem 11. Let (Ai, wi) be the partial solution at the end of the i-th round of MMS, and let (A∗, w∗) be
an optimal full solution. We prove by induction on i that suppwi(Ai) ≥
1
2suppw∗(A
∗), where the base case for
i = 0 holds trivially as we use the convention that suppw(∅) = ∞. Assuming now that the inequality holds for i,
an application of Lemma 12 for (Ai, wi) and (A
∗, w∗) implies that there is a candidate c′ ∈ A∗ \ Ai and a feasible
solution (Ai + c
′, w′) such that
suppw′(Ai + c
′) ≥ min
{
suppwi(Ai),
1
2
suppw∗(A
∗)
}
=
1
2
suppw∗(A
∗).
As the algorithm is bound to inspect candidate c′ in round i+1, and compute for it a balanced weight vectorwc which
maximizes the support of Ai + c
′ (by Lemma 4), the solution (Ai+1, wr+1) at the end of round i + 1 must have an
even higher support, i.e.
suppwi+1(Ai+1) ≥ suppwc(Ai + c) ≥ suppw′(Ai + c) ≥
1
2
suppw∗(A
∗).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 12. Let (A,w) and (A∗, w∗) be as in the statement, let t∗ := suppw∗(A∗), and let t :=
min{suppw(A), t∗/2}. To prove the lemma, it suffices to find a candidate c′ ∈ A∗ \ A and a feasible weight vector
w′ ∈ RE≥0 such that suppw′(A+ c) ≥ t.
By decreasing some components in w and w∗, we can assume without loss of generality that suppw(c) = t for each
c ∈ A, and suppw∗(c) = t
∗ for each c ∈ A∗. Define now the flow vector f := w∗ − w ∈ RE . We partition the
network nodes into four sets: relative to f , we have that a)N has a net excess of |A∗| · t∗− |A| · t, b) A \A∗ has a net
excess of |A\A∗| · t, c)A∗ \A has a net demand of |A∗ \A| · t∗, and d)A∩A∗ has a net demand of |A∩A∗| · (t∗− t).
Now, using the flow decomposition theorem, we can decompose flow f into circulations and simple paths, where each
path starts in a vertex with net excess and ends in a vertex with net demand. If we define f ′ to be the sub-flow of f
that contains only the simple paths that start in N and end in A∗ \A, then
net demand in A∗ \A wrt f ′ ≥ net demand in A∗ \A wrt f − net excess in A \A∗ wrt f
= |A∗ \A| · t∗ − |A \A∗| · t
≥ |A∗ \A| · (t∗ − t) ≥ |A∗ \A| · t,
6The original algorithm in [22] does not compute balanced weight vectors, but any vectorw that maximizes suppw(A), which is
indeed sufficient for our analysis. However, we propose the use of balanced vectors here as they achieve further desirable properties
(Lemmas 4 and 6) and because adding such requirement does not seem to cause any additional overhead in complexity.
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where the last two inequalities follow from |A∗| ≥ |A| and t ≤ t∗/2, respectively. By an averaging argument, this
implies that there is a candidate c′ ∈ A∗ \A with a demand of at least t relative to f ′. Finally, we define weight vector
w′ := w + f ′: by Lemma 7, w′ is non-negative and feasible. Furthermore, it provides the same support as w to each
committee member c ∈ A, namely t, and a support of at least t to candidate c′. Hence, suppw′(A+ c′) ≥ t.
MMS is a standard greedy algorithm. To conclude the section, we mention that a "lazy" version of it can save a factor
Θ(k) in the runtime while keeping the approximation guarantee virtually unchanged. In particular, in Appendix C we
prove the following result.
Theorem 13. There is an algorithm LazyMMS that, for any ε > 0, offers a (2 + ε)-approximation for the maximin
support problem, satisfies the PJR property, and executes in time O(Bal ·|C| · log(1/ε)).
4 A new heuristic
In the previous section we established that the efficient seqPhragmen heuristic [5] fails to provide a good guarantee
for the maximin support objective, whereasMMS [22] guarantees a 2-factor approximation albeit with a considerably
worse running time. In this section we introduce Phragmms, a new heuristic that is inspired in seqPhragmen and
maintains a comparable runtime, yet lends itself to more robust analyses both for maximin support and for PJR.
4.1 Inserting one candidate to a partial solution
We start with a brief analysis of the approaches taken inMMS and seqPhragmen. Both are iterative greedy algorithms
that start with an empty committee and add to it a new candidate over k iterations, following some specific rule for
candidate selection. For a given partial solution, MMS (Algorithm 1) computes a balanced weight vector for each
possible augmented committee resulting from adding a candidate, and keeps the one that offers the largest support.
Such a heuristic offers strong guarantees for maximin support, but is relatively slow as computing balanced vectors is
costly. On the other hand, the seqPhragmen heuristic (Algorithm 5 in Appendix B) forgoes balancing and replaces
it with a “lazy” version that performs minimal modifications to the current weight vector, making it balanced only in
the neighborhood around the newly inserted candidate. The Phragmms heuristic takes a similar approach, but uses a
slightly less lazy version of balancing, with a corresponding slight increase in runtime.
In all algorithms described in this section, we assume that there is a known background instance (G = (N∪C,E), s, k)
that does not need to be passed as input. Rather, the input is a partial solution (A,w) with |A| ≤ k. We also assume
that the list of committee member supports (suppw(c))c∈A is implicitly passed by reference and updated in every
algorithm, so it does not need to be recomputed every time. Let c′ ∈ C \A be a candidate that we consider adding to
(A,w). To do so, we need to modify weight vector w into a new feasible vector w′ that redirects towards c′ some of
the votes of voters in Nc′ , in turn decreasing the support of other committee members approved by these voters. Now,
for a given threshold t ≥ 0, we want to make sure not to reduce the support of any member c below t, assuming it
starts above t, and not to reduce it at all otherwise. A simple rule to ensure this is as follows: for each voter n in Nc′
and each member c ∈ A ∩ Cn, reduce the weight on edge nc from wnc to wnc ·min{1, t/suppw(c)}, and assign the
difference to edge nc′. That way, it is clear that even if all edges incident to a member c are so reduced in weight, the
support of c is scaled by a factor at most min{1, t/suppw(c)} and hence its new support does not fall below t.
Thus, if for each n ∈ N and t ≥ 0 we define that voter’s slack as
slack(A,w)(n, t) := sn −
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc ·min
{
1, t/suppw(c)
}
(4)
and for each c′ ∈ C \A and t ≥ 0 we define that candidate’s pre-score as
prescore(A,w)(c
′, t) :=
∑
n∈Nc′
slack(A,w)(n, t), (5)
then we can add c′ to the solution with a support of prescore(A,w)(c
′, t), while not making any other member’s
support decrease below threshold t. The resulting weight modification rule is formalized in Algorithm 2. The next
lemma easily follows from the previous exposition and its proof is skipped.
Lemma 14. For a feasible partial solution (A,w), candidate c′ ∈ C \ A and threshold t ≥ 0, Algorithm
Insert(A,w, c′, t) executes in time O(|E|) and returns a feasible solution (A + c′, w′) where suppw′(c′) =
prescore(A,w)(c
′, t) and suppw′(c) ≥ min{suppw(c), t} for each member c ∈ A. In particular, if
prescore(A,w)(c
′, t) ≥ t then suppw′(A+ c′) ≥ min{suppw(A), t}.
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Data: Partial feasible solution (A,w), candidate c′ ∈ C \A, threshold t ≥ 0.
Initialize w′ ← w;
for each voter n ∈ Nc′ do
Set w′nc′ ← sn;
for each member c ∈ A ∩ Cn do
if suppw(c) > t then update w
′
nc ← w
′
nc ·
t
suppw(c)
;
Update w′nc′ ← w
′
nc′ − w
′
nc;
end
end
return (A+ c′, w′);
Algorithm 2: Insert(A,w, c′, t)
Whenever partial solution (A,w) is clear from context, we drop the subscript from our notation of slack and pre-score.
When we add the new candidate c′ to the solution, we want to ensure that inequality prescore(c′, t) ≥ t holds, as we
want to avoid increasing the number of validators with support below threshold t. Thus, for each unelected candidate
c′ ∈ C \A we define its score to be the highest value of t such that prescore(c′, t) ≥ t holds, i.e.
score(A,w)(c
′) := max{t ≥ 0 : prescore(A,w)(c
′, t) ≥ t}, (6)
where again we drop the subscript if (A,w) is clear from context. Our heuristic now becomes apparent.
Heuristic (Phragmms). Given a partial solution (A,w), find a candidate cmax ∈ C \ A with highest score tmax =
maxc′∈C\A score(c
′), and execute Insert(A,w, cmax, tmax) so that its output solution (A+ cmax, w′) observes
∀c ∈ A, suppw′(c) ≥ min{suppw(c), tmax}, and suppw′(A+ cmax) ≥ min
{
suppw(A), tmax
}
.
In Appendix D we describe efficient algorithms to find the candidate with highest pre-score for a given threshold t, as
well as the candidate with overall highest score.
Theorem 15. For a partial solution (A,w) and threshold t ≥ 0, there is an algorithm MaxPrescore(A,w, t)
that executes in time O(|E|) and returns a tuple (ct, pt) such that ct ∈ C \ A and pt = prescore(ct, t) =
maxc′∈C\A prescore(c
′, t). Furthermore, there is an algorithm MaxScore(A,w) that runs in time O(|E| · log k)
and returns a tuple (cmax, tmax) such that tmax = score(cmax) = maxc′∈C\A score(c
′).
We remark that our heuristic, which finds a candidate with highest score and adds it to the current partial solution
(Algorithm MaxScore followed by Insert) executes in time O(|E| · log k). It thus matches up to a logarithmic term
the running time of seqPhragmen which is O(|E|) per iteration; see Appendix B. In Appendix D we also draw
parallels between the seqPhragmen and Phragmms heuristics, and explain how the latter can be seen as a natural
complication of the former which always grants higher score values to candidates and thus inserts them with higher
supports.
4.2 A faster constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximin support
We proved in Section 3 that a 2-approximation algorithm for maximin support can be computed in timeO(Bal ·|C| ·k)
or O(Bal ·|C|) (Theorems 11 and 13 respectively). We use the Phragmms heuristic to develop a 3.15-approximation
algorithm that runs in time O(Bal ·k), and satisfies PJR as well. We highlight that this is the fastest known algorithm
to achieve a constant-factor guarantee for maximin support, and that gains in speed are of paramount importance for
our application to validator election in NPoS, where there are hundreds of candidates and a massive number of voters.
We propose BalPhragmms (Algorithm 3), an iterative greedy algorithm that starts with an empty committee and
alternates between inserting a new candidate with the Phragmms heuristic, and rebalancing the weight vector, i.e.
replacing it with a balanced one. This constitutes a middle ground between the approach taken in seqPhragmenwhere
the weight vector is never rebalanced, and the approach inMMS whereO(|C|) balanced vectors are computed in each
iteration. We formalize the procedure below. Notice that running the Insert procedure (Algorithm2) before rebalancing
is optional, but the step simplifies the analysis, and provides a good starting point to the balancing algorithm.
Theorem 16. BalPhragmms (Algorithm 3) offers a 3.15-approximation for the maximin support problem, satisfies
the PJR property, and executes in time O(Bal ·k), assuming that Bal = Ω(|E| · log k).
This in turn proves Theorem 1. The claim on runtime is straightforward: we established in Theorem 15 that the
Phragmms heuristic runs in time O(|E| · log k), so each iteration of BalPhragmms has a runtime of O(|E| · log k +
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Data: Approval graphG = (N ∪ C,E), vector s of vote strengths, committee size k.
Initialize A = ∅ and w = 0 ∈ RE≥0;
for i from 1 to k do
Let (cmax, tmax)← MaxScore(A,w) // the candidate with highest score, and its score ;
Update (A,w) ← Insert(A,w, cmax, tmax) // or optionally just update A← A+ cmax ;
Replace w with a balanced weight vector for A;
end
return (A,w);
Algorithm 3: BalPhragmms
Bal) = O(Bal), where in the last equality we assume that Bal = Ω(|E| · log k). In fact, in Appendix D we improve
upon this analysis and prove that each iteration can be made to run in time O(|E|+Bal). Next, in order to prove PJR
we need the following technical lemmas.
Lemma 17. If (A,w) and (A′, w′) are two balanced partial solutions with A ⊆ A′, then suppw(c) ≥ suppw′(c) for
each candidate c ∈ A. Furthermore, for each c′ ∈ C \A′ we have that score(A,w)(c
′) ≥ score(A′,w′)(c
′).
Lemma 18. If suppw(A) ≥ maxc′∈C\A score(c
′) holds for a full solution (A,w), then A satisfies PJR.
Lemma 17 formalizes the intuition that as more candidates are added to committee A, supports and scores can only
decrease, never increase; its proof is delayed to Appendix E. Lemma 18 provides a sense of local optimality to solution
(A,w), because if the corresponding inequality did not hold we could attempt to improve the solution by swapping
the member with least support for the unelected candidate with highest score; its proof is delayed to Section 5.1 where
we explore this notion of local optimality and its relation with the PJR property. We prove now that the output of
BalPhragmms satisfies the condition in Lemma 18, and hence satisfies PJR.
Lemma 19. At the end of each one of the k iterations of Algorithm BalPhragmms, if (A,w) is the current partial
balanced solution, we have that suppw(A) ≥ maxc′∈C\A score(A,w)(c
′).
Proof. Let (Ai, wi) be the partial solution at the end of the i-th iteration. We prove the claim by induction on i, where
the base case for i = 0 holds trivially as we use the convention that suppw0(∅) = ∞ for any w0. For i ≥ 1, suppose
that on iteration i we insert a candidate ci with highest score, and let w
′ be the weight vector obtained from running
Insert(Ai−1, wi−1, ci, score(Ai−1,wi−1)(ci)) (Algorithm 2). Then
suppwi(Ai) ≥ suppw′(Ai) (as wi is balanced for Ai)
≥ min{suppwi−1(Ai−1), score(Ai−1,wi−1)(ci)} (by Lemma 14)
≥ max
c′∈C\Ai−1
score(Ai−1,wi−1)(c
′) (by induction hyp. and by choice of ci)
≥ max
c′∈C\Ai
score(Ai,wi)(c
′). (by Lemma 17)
This completes the proof.
It remains to prove the claimed approximation guarantee of Algorithm BalPhragmms. To do that, we need the
following technical result which, informally speaking, establishes that if a partial solution is balanced, then there must
be a subset of voters with large slacks, and neighboring unelected candidates with high pre-scores and scores.
Lemma 20. Let (A∗, w∗) be an optimal solution to the maximin support instance, t∗ = suppw∗(A
∗), and let (A,w)
be a balanced solution with |A| ≤ k and A 6= A∗. For each 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, there is a subset N(a) ⊆ N of voters such
that
1. each voter n ∈ N(a) has a neighbor in A∗ \A;
2. for each voter n ∈ N(a), we have that suppw(A ∩ Cn) := minc∈A∩Cn suppw(c) ≥ at
∗;
3.
∑
n∈N(a) sn ≥ |A
∗ \A| · (1− a)t∗; and
4. for any b with a ≤ b ≤ 1 we have that N(b) ⊆ N(a), and for each n ∈ N(a) we have that n is also in N(b)
if and only if property 2 above holds for n with parameter a replaced by b.
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Proof. Fix a parameter 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and define the setN ′ := {n ∈ N : suppw(A∩Cn) ≥ at∗}, where suppw(∅) =∞
by convention. If we defineN(a) ⊆ N ′ as those voters in N ′ that have a neighbor in A∗ \A, then properties 1, 2 and
4 become evident. Hence, it only remains to prove the third property.
We claim that there is no edge with non-zero weight between N \ N ′ and A′ := {c ∈ A : suppw(c) ≥ at∗}.
Indeed, if there was a pair n ∈ N \ N ′, c ∈ A′ with wnc > 0, then by point 3 of Lemma 4 we would have that
suppw(A ∩ Cn) = suppw(c) ≥ at∗, contradicting the fact that n 6∈ N . Thus, we get the inequality
∑
n∈N\N ′
sn ≤
∑
c∈A\A′
suppw(c) < |A \A
′| · at∗ < |A∗ \A′| · at∗.
By reducing some components in vectors w and w∗, we can assume without loss of generality that suppw∗(c) = t
∗
if c ∈ A∗, zero otherwise, and suppw(c) = at∗ if c ∈ A∗ ∩ A′, zero otherwise. Define f := w∗ − w ∈ RE ,
which we interpret as a vector of flows over the network induced by N ∪ A∗, with positive signs corresponding to
flow leaving N , and vice-versa. We partition the network nodes into four sets: N ′, N \ N ′, A∗ ∩ A′, and A∗ \ A′.
Relative to f , we have that a) N has a net excess of |A∗| · t∗ − |A∗ ∩ A′| · at∗, b) N \N ′ has a net excess of at most∑
n∈N\N ′ sn < |A
∗ \A′| · at∗ (by the previous inequality), and c) A∗ ∩A′ has a net demand of |A∗ ∩A′| · (1− a)t∗.
Using the flow decomposition theorem, we can decompose flow f into circulations and simple paths. If we define f ′
to be the sub-flow of f that contains only the simple paths that start in N ′ and end in A∗ \A′, then
flow value in f ′ ≥ ( net excess in N − net excess in N \N ′ − net demand in A∗ ∩ A′) w.r.t. f
≥ |A∗| · t∗ − |A∗ ∩ A′| · at∗ − |A∗ \A′| · at∗ − |A∗ ∩A′| · (1− a)t∗
= |A∗ \A′| · (1− a)t∗ ≥ |A∗ \A| · (1− a)t∗.
A key observation now is that none of the flow in f ′ can pass by any node in N \ N ′ or A∗ ∩ A \ A′; see Figure 2.
This is because any path in f ′ starts in N ′, nodes in N ′ have no neighbors in A \A′ (by definitions ofN ′ andA′), and
furthermore there is no flow possible from (A∗ \A)∪ (A∗∩A′) toN \N ′ in f = w∗−w, becausew has no flow from
N \N ′ toward A′ (by our claim) nor toward A∗ \A (by our assumption wlog on w). Therefore, the formula above is
actually a lower bound on the flow going from N ′ to A∗ \A. Finally, we notice that for each path in f ′, the last edge
goes fromN ′ toA∗\A, so it originates inN(a). This proves that
∑
n∈N(a) sn ≥ flow value in f
′ ≥ |A∗\A|·(1−a)t∗,
which is the third property.
no edges
no backward flow
N ′
N \N ′
A∗ ∩ A′
A∗ \A
A∗ ∩ A \A′
start of flow f ′
end of flow f ′
(A∗ \A) ∪ (A∗ ∩A \A′) = A∗ \A′
Figure 2: Flow f ′ can only visit nodes in N ′, A∗ ∩ A′ and A∗ \A.
As a warm-up, we show how this last result easily implies a 4-approximation guarantee for BalPhragmms.
Lemma 21. If (A,w), (A∗, w∗) and t∗ are as in Lemma 20, there is a candidate c′ ∈ A∗ \A with score(c′) ≥ t∗/4.
Therefore, BalPhragmms provides a 4-approximation for the maximin support problem.
Proof. Apply Lemma 20 with a = 1/2. In what follows we refer to the properties stated in that lemma. We have that
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∑
c′∈A∗\A
prescore(c′, t∗/4) =
∑
c′∈A∗\A
∑
n∈Nc′
slack(n, t∗/4) ≥
∑
n∈N(a)
slack(n, t∗/4) (by property 1)
≥
∑
n∈N(a)
[
sn −
t∗
4
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc
suppw(c)
]
(by equation 4)
≥
∑
n∈N(a)
[
sn −
1
2
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc
]
(by property 2)
≥
1
2
∑
n∈N(a)
sn ≥
1
2
(|A∗ \A| · t∗/2) = |A∗ \A| · t∗/4. (by ineq. 2 and property 3)
Therefore, by an averaging argument, there must be a candidate c′ ∈ A∗ \ A with prescore(c′, t∗/4) ≥ t∗/4, which
implies that score(c′) ≥ t∗/4, by definition of score. The 4-approximation guarantee for Algorithm BalPhragmms
easily follows by induction on the k iterations, using Lemma 14 and the fact that rebalancing a partial solution never
decreases its least member support.
To get a better approximation guarantee for Algorithm BalPhragmms and finish the proof of Theorem 16, we ap-
ply Lemma 20 with a different parameter a. For this, we will use the following result whose proof is delayed to
Apppendix E.
Lemma 22. Consider a strictly increasing and differentiable function f : R → R, with a unique root χ. For a finite
sum
∑
i∈I αif(xi) where αi ∈ R and xi ≥ χ for each i ∈ I , we have that∑
i∈I
aif(xi) =
∫ ∞
χ
f ′(x)
( ∑
i∈I: xi≥x
ai
)
dx.
Lemma 23. If (A,w), (A∗, w∗) and t∗ are as in Lemma 20, there is a candidate c′ ∈ A∗\A with score(c′) ≥ t∗/3.15.
Therefore, BalPhragmms provides a 3.15-approximation for the maximin support problem.
Proof. Again we apply Lemma 20 and its properties, for a parameter 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 to be defined later. We have∑
c′∈A∗\A
prescore(c′, at∗) =
∑
c′∈A∗\A
∑
n∈Nc
slack(n, at∗) ≥
∑
n∈N(a)
slackw(n, at
∗) (by property 1)
≥
∑
n∈N(a)
[
sn − at
∗
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc
suppw(c)
]
(by equation 4)
≥
∑
n∈N(a)
[
sn −
at∗
suppw(A ∩Cn)
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc
]
(by property 2)
≥
∑
n∈N(a)
sn
[
1−
at∗
suppw(A ∩ Cn)
]
, (by ineq. 2)
where suppw(∅) = ∞ by convention. At this point, we apply Lemma 22 over function f(x) := 1 − a/x, which has
the unique root χ = a, and index set I = N(a) with αn = sn and xn = suppw(A ∩ Cn)/t∗. We obtain∑
c′∈A∗\A
prescore(c′, at∗) ≥
∫ ∞
a
f ′(x)
( ∑
n∈N(a): suppw(A∩Cn)≥xt∗
sn
)
dx
=
∫ ∞
a
a
x2
( ∑
n∈N(x)
sn
)
dx (by property 4)
≥
∫ 1
a
a
x2
(
|A∗ \A| · (1− x)t∗
)
dx (by property 3)
= |A∗ \A| · at∗
∫ 1
a
( 1
x2
−
1
x
)
dx
= |A∗ \A| · at∗
(1
a
− 1 + ln a
)
.
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If we now set a = 1/3.15, we have that 1/a− 1 + ln a ≥ 1, and thus by an averaging argument there is a candidate
c′ ∈ A∗ \ A for which prescore(c′, at∗) ≥ at∗, and hence score(c′) ≥ at∗. The approximation guarantee for
Algorithm BalPhragmms follows by induction on the k iterations, as before.
5 Exploiting local optimality
We start the section with an key property of algorithm BalPhragmms as motivation.
Theorem 24. If (A,w) is a balanced solution such that suppw(A) ≥ maxc′∈C\A score(c
′), then it satisfies PJR
and guarantees a 3.15-factor approximation for the maximin support problem. Furthermore, testing the required
conditions (feasibility, balancedness and the previous inequality) can be done in time O(|E|). Finally, the output
solution of the BalPhragmms algorithm is guaranteed to satisfy these conditions.
Proof. The first statement follows from Lemmas 18 and 23, and the third one from Lemma 19. Feasibility (inequal-
ity 2) can clearly be checked in time O(|E|), as can balancedness by Lemma 4, because properties 2 and 3 in that
lemma can both be tested in this time. Finally, if t := suppw(A), the inequality in the statement is equivalent
to t ≥ maxc′∈C\A prescore(c
′, t), which is tested with algorithm MaxPrescore(A,w, t) in time O(|E|) by Theo-
rem 15.
This in turn proves Theorem 2. A result such as the one above is essential in a scenario where a computationally limited
user (the verifier) offloads a heavy task – in this case an election algorithm – to one or more external entities with more
computational power (the prover). Yet, as the task is executed privately and the user does not trust the entities, the user
must be in condition to provably and efficiently check the quality of the output. In the case of an election protocol over
a decentralized blockchain, it would be very costly to run the full election algorithm as an on-chain process, meaning
that validators must execute it simultaneously and the chain cannot progress until they have finished the execution and
agreed on the output. Instead, a much more scalable solution is to execute the protocol off-chain, meaning that one or
more parties run it privately and separate from block production, and then submit the output which is approved if it
passes the verification test on-chain. The fact that algorithmBalPhragmms can have both of its guarantees efficiently
verified on it outputs is in our opinion its most relevant feature.
The inequality suppw(A) ≥ maxc′∈C\A score(c
′) mentioned in Lemma 18 and Theorem 24 corresponds to a notion
of local optimality, for a local search variant of the Phragmms heuristic. In Section 5.1 we explore the relation
between this notion and the PJR property. Then, in Section 5.2 we use the corresponding local search algorithm to
devise a post-computation which takes an arbitrary solution (A,w) as input, and returns an output (A′, w′) which
observes suppw′(A
′) ≥ suppw(A) and provably satisfies PJR.
5.1 A parametric version of proportional justified representation
We define next a parametric version of the PJR property that measures just how well represented the voters are by a
given committee A. It is a generalization of the property which turns it from binary to quantitative.
Definition 25. For any t ∈ R≥0, a committeeA ⊆ C (of any size) satisfies Proportional Justified Representation with
parameter t (t-PJR for short) if there is no group N ′ ⊆ N of voters and integer 0 < r ≤ |A| such that:
a)
∑
n∈N ′ sn ≥ r · t,
b) | ∩n∈N ′ Cn| ≥ r, and
c) |A ∩ (∪n∈N ′Cn)| < r.
In words, if there is a group N ′ of voters with at least r commonly approved candidates, who can afford to provide
these candidates with a support of value t each, then this group is represented by at least r members in committee
A, though not necessarily commonly approved. Notice that the standard version of PJR is equivalent to tˆ-PJR for
tˆ :=
∑
n∈N sn/|A| (see Section 2), and that if a committee satisfies t-PJR then it also satisfies t
′-PJR for each t′ ≥ t,
i.e. the property gets stronger as t decreases. Notice as well that this is in contrast to the maximin support objective,
which implies a stronger property as it increases; we will exploit the opposite natures of these two parameters of
quality in Section 5.2 to define a procedure that improves upon a given solution.
We remark that in [21] the related notion of average satisfaction is introduced, also to quantify the level of proportional
representation achieved by a committee. Roughly speaking, that notion measures the average number of representa-
tives in the committee that each voter in a group has, for any group of voters with sufficiently high vote strength and
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cohesiveness level. In contrast, with parametric PJR we focus on providing sufficient representatives to the group as a
whole and not to each individual voter, and we measure the required vote strength for a group to achieve it. Interest-
ingly, the average satisfaction measure is closely linked to the property of extended justified representation (EJR) [2],
and in [3] that measure is used to prove that a local search algorithm achieves EJR. Similarly, we use parametric PJR
to prove that a local search algorithm achieves standard PJR.
Testing whether an arbitrary solution satisfies standard PJR is known to be coNP-complete [3], hence the same remains
true for its parametric version. We provide next a sufficient condition for a committee to satisfy t-PJR, which is
efficiently testable, based on our definitions of pre-score and score.
Lemma 26. If for a feasible solution (A,w) there is a parameter t ∈ R≥0 such that maxc′∈C\A prescore(c
′, t) < t,
or equivalently, such thatmaxc′∈C\A score(c
′) < t, then committee A satisfies t-PJR.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive of the claim. If A does not satisfy t-PJR, there must be a subsetN ′ ⊆ N of voters
and an integer r > 0 that observe points a) through c) in the definition above. By points b) and c), set (∩n∈N ′Cn) \A
must be non-empty: let c′ be a candidate in it. We will prove that for any feasible weight vector w ∈ RE≥0, it holds
that prescore(c′, t) ≥ t, and consequently score(c′) ≥ t by the definition of score. We have
prescore(c′, t) =
∑
n∈NC′
slack(n, t) ≥
∑
n∈N ′
slack(n, t) (as N ′ ⊆ Nc′)
≥
∑
n∈N ′
(
sn − t ·
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc
suppw(c)
)
(by definition 4)
=
∑
n∈N ′
sn − t ·
∑
c∈A∩(∪n∈N′Cn)
∑
n∈N ′∩Nc
wnc∑
n∈Nc
wnc
(where fraction is ≤ 1)
≥ t · r − t · |A ∩ (∪n∈N ′Cn)| (by a))
≥ t · r − t · (r − 1) = t (by c)).
This proves that prescore(c′, t) ≥ t, which is what we needed to show.
For a given solution (A,w) and parameter t, one can verify the condition above in time O(|E|) by checking
whether MaxPrescore(A,w, t) < t; see Theorem 15. Alternatively, from just solution (A,w) one can execute
MaxScore(A,w) in time O(|E| · log k) to obtain the highest score tmax and ascertain that A satisfies t-PJR for
each t > tmax. The proof of Lemma 18 now follows as a corollary.
Proof of Lemma 18. Let tmax := maxc′∈C\A score(tmax) and let cmax ∈ C \ A be a candidate with such highest
score. If suppw(A) ≥ tmax, it follows from Lemma 14 that if we execute Insert(A,w, cmax, tmax), we obtain a
solution (A + cmax, w
′) with suppw′(A + cmax) = tmax. Now, by feasibility of vector w
′, we have the inequality∑
n∈N sn ≥
∑
c∈A+cmax
suppw′(c) ≥ (k + 1) · tmax, and thus tmax ≤
∑
n∈N sn/(k + 1) <
∑
n∈N sn/k = tˆ. By
Lemma 26 above, havingmaxc′∈C\A score(tmax) < tˆ implies that A satisfies tˆ-PJR, which is standard PJR.
5.2 A local search algorithm
Suppose that we know of an efficient algorithm with good guarantees for maximin support but no guarantee for PJR,
or we happen to know of a high quality solution in terms of maximin support but we ignore if it satisfies PJR. Can we
use it to find a new solution of no lesser quality which is also guaranteed to satisfy PJR? And can we efficiently prove
to a verifier that the new solution indeed satisfies PJR? We answer these questions in the positive for the first time.
We present a local search algorithm that takes an arbitrary feasible solution as input, and iteratively drops a member of
least support and inserts a new candidate using the Phragmms heuristic. The procedure always maintains or increases
the value of the least member support, hence the quality of the solution is preserved. Furthermore, as the solution
converges to a local optimum, it is guaranteed to satisfy the PJR after a certain number of iterations. Therefore,
when used as a post-computation, this procedure can make any approximation algorithm for maximin support also
satisfy PJR in a black-box manner. We remark here that such an application of the Phragmms heuristic goes to show
the robustness of the election rule; in particular, there is no evident way to build a similar post-computation from
seqPhragmen [5], as the analysis of the PJR property in that rule is heavily dependent on the way the solution is
constructed.
14
A PREPRINT - JULY 28, 2020
As we did in Section 4.1, in the following algorithm we assume that the background instance (G = (N ∪ C,E), s, k)
is known and that does not need to be passed as input. Instead, the input is a feasible full solution (A,w), and a
parameter ε > 0. Our proposed algorithm PostPhragmms (Algorithm 4) is presented below.
Data: Full feasible solution (A,w), parameter ε > 0.
Let tˆ←
∑
n∈N sn/|A|;
while True do
Find tuple (cmin, tmin) so that cmin ∈ A and tmin = suppw(cmin) = suppw(A);
Let (cmax, tmax)← MaxScore(A,w) // the candidate with highest score, and its score;
if (tmax < min{(1 + ε) · tmin, tˆ}) then return (A,w);
Update (A,w) ← Insert(A− cmin, w, cmax, tmax);
end
Algorithm 4: PostPhragmms(A,w, ε)
Theorem 27. For any parameter ε > 0 and a feasible full solution (A,w), let (A′, w′) be the output solution to
PostPhragmms(A,w, ε). Then:
1. solution (A′, w′) is feasible and full, and suppw′(A′) ≥ suppw(A);
2. solution (A′, w′) satisfies the condition on Lemma 26 for parameter t = min{(1+ε) ·suppw′(A′), tˆ}, where
tˆ =
∑
n∈N sn/k, so A
′ satisfies t-PJR and standard PJR;
3. if (A,w) has an α-approximation guarantee for the maximin support objective, for some α ≥ 1, then the
algorithm performs at most k · (1 + log1+ε α) + 1 iterations, each taking time O(|E| · log k); and
4. by setting ε→∞, the algorithm finds a solution satisfying standard PJR in at most k + 1 iterations.
This proves Theorem 3. Notice that point 3 establishes that PostPhragmms can be executed as a post-computation of
any constant-factor approximation algorithm formaximin support in timeO(|E|·k log k). In particular, this complexity
is dominated by that of all constant-factor approximations presented in this paper. By point 4, the algorithm can be
sped up if we only care about standard PJR, or run further iterations to achieve a stronger parametric PJR guarantee.
In the proof, we use the observation below whose proof is skipped as it follows from the definitions of slack and
pre-score.
Lemma 28. For a feasible vector w ∈ RE≥0, two committees A ⊆ A
′, and any threshold t ≥ 0 it holds that
prescore(A,w)(c
′, t) ≥ prescore(A′,w)(c
′, t) for each candidate c′ ∈ C \A′.
Proof of Theorem 27. We start with some notation. We use i as a superscript to indicate the value of the different
variables at the beginning of the the i-th iteration. We define tistop := min{(1 + ε) · t
i
min, tˆ}, so that the stopping
condition reads timax
?
< tistop. Notice that t
i
stop ≥ t
i
min always holds by feasibility of w
i and definition of tˆ.
We prove point 1 by induction on i. If the stopping condition does not hold then timax ≥ t
i
stop ≥ t
i
min. Next, by
Lemma 28 we have prescore(Ai−ci
min
,wi)(c
i
max, t
i
max) ≥ prescore(Ai,wi)(c
i
max, t
i
max) = t
i
max ≥ t
i
min. On the other
hand, it is evident that suppwi(A
i − cimin) ≥ suppwi(A
i) = timin. Therefore, by Lemma 14 we have that
suppwi+1(A
i+1) ≥ min{suppwi(A
i − cimin), prescore(Ai−ci
min
,wi)(c
i
max, t
i
max)} ≥ t
i
min,
and that (Ai+1, wi+1) is feasible. This proves point 1. Point 2 is apparent from the stopping condition.
We continue to point 3. Each iteration is dominated in complexity by the call to Algorithm MaxScore, which takes
time O(|E| · log k) by Theorem 15. Hence, it remains to give a bound on the number T of total iterations. To do that,
we analyze the evolution of the least member support timin = suppwi(A
i). First, we argue that if ever timin = tˆ, then
the algorithm terminates immediately, i.e. i = T ; this is because in this case all members in Ai must have a support of
exactly tˆ, all voters a zero slack for threshold tˆ, and all candidates in C \Ai a zero prescore for threshold tˆ and hence a
score strictly below tˆ, and the stopping condition is fulfilled. Next, we claim that for any iteration iwith 1 ≤ i < T−k,
we have ti+kmin ≥ (1 + ε) · t
i
min. This is because, by Lemma 14, in each iteration j ≥ i we are removing a member with
least support while not increasing the number of members with support below
prescore(Aj−cj
min
,wj)(c
j
max, t
j
max) ≥ t
j
max ≥ t
j
stop ≥ t
i
stop.
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As there are only k candidates, we must have that ti+kmin ≥ t
i
stop = min{(1 + ε) · t
i
min, tˆ}. Thus t
i+k
min is either at least
(1 + ε) · timin, or it is tˆ, but it cannot be the latter by the previous claim and the fact that i + k < T . This proves
the new claim. Therefore, if the algorithm outputs a solution (AT , wT ) and has an input solution (A1, w1) with an
α-approximation guarantee for the maximin support objective, then
α · suppw1(A
1) ≥ suppwT (A
T ) ≥ (1 + ε)⌊(T−1)/k⌋ · suppw1(A
1).
Hence, α ≥ (1 + ε)⌊(T−1)/k⌋, and T ≤ k · (1 + log1+ε α) + 1. This completes the proof of point 3.
For point 4, we consider again the previous inequality ti+kmin ≥ t
i
stop = min{(1 + ε) · t
i
min, tˆ}. By setting i = 1 and
ε → ∞, we have that either the stopping condition is triggered before the (k + 1)-st iteration, or it must be the case
that tk+1min ≥ tˆ, and the algorithm terminates immediately as argued previously. In either case, the claim on standard
PJR follows from point 2.
6 A protocol for validator election in NPoS
In this section we provide high-level details of a proposal for a validator election protocol in an NPoS-based blockchain
network. This proposal will be the basis for an implementation in the Polkadot network.
A committee of k validators is selected once per era, where an era is multiple hours or days long. In each era, a group
of off-chain workers each privately runs the election algorithm for the next era, and submits its solution on-chain. We
propose that each validator act as an off-chain worker and run such computation, but this need not be the case. More
in detail, towards the end of each era there is an election window where the following events occur:
1. The chain fixes the (otherwise ever-evolving) set of validator candidates and nominators’ preferences and
stake to be considered for the election, ignoring any further changes in the remainder of the era.
2. All current validators trigger an off-chain execution of the BalPhragmms election rule, separate from block
production and other duties.
3. Once the solutions are computed (after a few seconds of the start of the election window), validators submit
them on-chain as a special type of transaction.
4. On the on-chain side, we only keep track of one solution at any given time, which is the current tentative
winner. Specifically, if (At, wt) is the tentative winner recorded on-chain, a block producer can include a
new solution (A,w) to its block only if a) it is feasible, b) suppw(A) > suppwt(At), and c) it passes the test
described in Theorem 24. If this is the case, (A,w) replaces (At, wt) as the current tentative winner.
5. At the end of the election window, the current tentative winner is declared the official winner.
We make a few remarks about this protocol.
• By Theorem 24, the protocol will elect a solution that simultaneously satisfies the PJR property and a 3.15-
factor approximation for the maximin support problem. These constitute strong and formal guarantees on
security and proportionality.
• On top of guarantees above, we are bound to elect the best solution found by anyone. In particular, validators
may find diverse solutions due to different tie-breaking rules, or more explicit deviations from the suggested
algorithm. However, as long as we rank solutions objectively and pick the best one, any diversity in solutions
can only improve the quality of the winning committee, and thus benefits the community.
• The fact that the guarantees on security and proportionality are verifiable protect the network against a long
range attack, i.e. a scenario where an adversary creates a branch of the blockchain which is grown in secret,
with the intention to eventually make it public and have it overtake the main chain. In particular, if the pro-
tocol limited itself to select the best solution submitted by validators without a verification of guarantees, an
adversary could use a long range attack to create a branch in which, during an election window, it censors all
solutions coming from honest validators and thus makes the protocol elect a committee where the adversary
is heavily overrepresented.
• On the on-chain side, the election protocol runs in linear time O(|E|) per block, by Theorem 24 and the fact
that at most one solution is verified per block.
Next, we suggest additional variations and optimizations:
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• We suggest that instead of gossiping a solution over the network as a transaction, each validator waits for
its turn to be a block producer to submit its solution. Doing so saves communication overhead, as election
solutions make for rather heavy transactions. In this case, it is important that the election window is long
enough so that with high probability each validator gets to produce a block, and thus is not censored. The
system can still receive solutions as transactions from arbitrary users, but in this case the transaction fee must
be high to protect against spamming attacks.
• For any weight vector w ∈ RE≥0, let Ew denote its edge support, i.e. Ew := {e ∈ E : we > 0}, and
notice that the size of a solution (A,w) is dominated by the size of its edge support |Ew |. However, by
removing circulations, from any feasible vector w one can compute another feasible vector w′ ∈ RE≥0 such
that a) all supports are preserved, i.e. suppw(c) = suppw′(c) for each c ∈ C, and b) Ew′ is a forest, and
hence |Ew′ | < |N | + k = O(|N |), where we assume that |N | ≥ k. Therefore, validators can run this
post-computation off-chain to reduce the size of any solution to O(|N |), thus saving space on the block.
• Recall that on the on-chain side, for a new solution (A,w) we check a) feasibility, b) its objective value
(and whether it beats the current tentative winner), and c) the test in Theorem 24. Notice that the third
check runs in time O(|E|) and thus is considerably slower than the first two checks, which run in time
O(|Ew |), with O(|Ew |) = O(|N |) if the previous suggestion is implemented. A possible optimization is
as follows: the chain requires the first submitted solution (A0, w0) to pass all three checks, and then skips
the third check on all subsequent solutions, so that their processing time drops to O(|N |). At the end of
the election window, we check whether the current tentative winner (At, wt) satisfies PJR with the condition
on Lemma 26. We can expect that this check is always passed. In the unlikely case that (At, wt) fails this
condition, the election window is extended for a few more minutes and validators are asked to run the post-
computation PostPhragmms over it off-chain. The window ends as soon as some block producer submits
a feasible solution (AT , wT ) such that suppwT (AT ) ≥ suppwt(At) and which satisfies PJR as attested
by the condition on Lemma 26. With this optimization, the runtime drops to O(|N |) per block, except
for two or possibly three blocks with a runtime of O(|E|), and we keep all guarantees, namely that the
winning committee a) is at least as good as all submitted solutions, b) satisfies PJR, and c) is a 3.15-factor
approximation for maximin support (as its objective value is at least as good as that of the first solution
(A0, w0), which passed the test in Theorem 24).
• In terms of incentives, the system can provide an economic reward to the submitter of each tentative win-
ning solution, with larger rewards for the first and the last one to encourage early submissions and good
submissions respectively. If the previous suggestion is implemented and a solution (At, wt) fails the test on
Lemma 26, a heavy fine should be charged to the submitter.
A Algorithms to compute a balanced solution
Recall from Section 2 that, for a given election instance (G = (N ∪ C,E), s, k) and a fixed committee A ⊆ C, a
weight vector w ∈ RE≥0 is balanced for A if a) it maximizes the sum of member supports,
∑
c∈A suppw(c), over all
feasible weight vectors, and b) it minimizes the sum of supports squared,
∑
c∈A(suppw(c))
2, over all vectors that
observe the previous point.
We start by noticing that a balanced weight vector can be computed with numerical methods for quadratic convex
programs. Let EA ⊆ E be the restriction of the input edge set over edges incident to committee A, and let D ∈
{0, 1}A×EA be the vertex-edge incidence matrix forA. For any weight vertex w ∈ REA≥0 , the support that w assigns to
candidates in A is given by vectorDw, so that suppw(c) = (Dw)c for each c ∈ A. We can now write the problem of
finding a balanced weight vector as a convex program:
Minimize ‖Dw‖2
Subject to w ∈ REA≥0 ,∑
c∈Cn
wnc ≤ sn for each n ∈ N, and
1
⊺Dw =
∑
n∈∪c∈ANc
sn,
where the first two lines of constraints corresponds to non-negativity and feasibility conditions (see inequality 2), and
the last line ensures that the sum of supports is maximized, where 1 ∈ RA is the all-ones vector.
However, there is a more efficient method using techniques for parametric flow, which we sketch now. Hochbaum
and Hong [11, Section 6] consider a network resource allocation problem which generalizes the problem of finding
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a balanced weight vector: given a network with a single source, single sink and edge capacities, minimize the sum
of squared flows over the edges reaching the sink, over all maximum flows. They show that this is equivalent to
a parametric flow problem called lexicographically optimal flow, studied by Gallo, Gregoriadis and Tarjan [8]. In
turn, in this last paper the authors show that, even though a parametric flow problem usually requires solving several
consecutive max-flow instances, this particular problem can be solved running a single execution of the FIFO preflow-
push algorithm proposed by Goldberg and Tarjan [10].
Therefore, the complexity of finding a balanced weight vector is bounded by that of Goldberg and Tarjan’s algorithm,
which is O(n3) for a general n-node network. However, Ahuja et al. [1] showed how to optimize several popular
network flow algorithms for the case of bipartite networks, where one of the partitions is considerably smaller than
the other. Assuming the sizes of the bipartition are n1 and n2 with n1 ≪ n2, they implement a two-edge push rule
that allows one to "charge" most of the computation weight to the nodes on the small partition, and hence obtain
algorithms whose running times depend on n1 rather than n. In particular, they show how to adapt Goldberg and
Tarjan’s algorithm to run in time O(e · n1 + n
3
1), where e is the number of edges. For our particular problem, which
can be defined on a bipartite graph (N ∪A,EA) where |A| ≤ k≪ |N |, we obtain thus an algorithm that runs in time
O(|EA| · k + k3).
B A negative example for the sequential Phragmén heuristic
In this section we analyze the performance of seqPhragmen [5] with respect to the maximin support objective.
Data: Bipartite approval graphG = (N ∪C,E), vector s of vote strengths, target committee size k.
Initialize A = ∅, w = 0 ∈ RE≥0, load(n) = 0 for each n ∈ N , and load(c
′) = 0 for each c′ ∈ C;
for i = 1, 2, · · · k do
for each candidate c′ ∈ C \A do update load(c′)←
1+
∑
n∈N
c′
sn·load(n)
∑
n∈N
c′
sn
;
Find cmin ∈ argminc′∈C\A load(c
′);
Update A← A+ cmin;
for each voter n ∈ Ncmin do
Update wncmin ← load(cmin)− load(n);
Update load(n)← load(cmin);
end
end
Scaling edge weights: for each nc ∈ E with wnc > 0, update wnc ← wnc ·
sn
load(n) ;
return (A,w);
Algorithm 5: seqPhragmen, proposed in [5]
The method proposed in [5] only considers unit votes, and outputs only a committee. In Algorithm 5 we present
a generalization that admits weighted votes in the input, and outputs a feasible edge weight vector along with the
committee, for ease of comparison with other algorithms in this paper. We remark however that the numerical example
we present below can be easily converted into another with unit votes – where each voter n is replaced with a cluster
of voters with unit vote strength and where the cluster size is proportional to sn – that would lead to the same negative
result for the method in [5], even when the output committee is coupled with a balanced weight vector.
We exhibit now a family of instances where the approximation ratio offered by the output of Algorithm 5 equals the
k-th harmonic numberHk :=
∑k
i=1 1/i = Θ(log k). This proves Lemma 10.
Proof of Lemma 10. For an arbitrarily small constant ε > 0 and a committee size k, consider an instance where
N = {n0, · · · , nk}, C = {c0, · · · , ck}, snj = 1 and Cnj = {ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ j} for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and
s0 = 1/(Hk − ε) with Cn0 = {c0}; see Figure 3. It is easy to see that if committee {c1, · · · , ck} is selected, each
member can be given a support of value 1. On the other hand, any committee that selects candidate c0 can only
provide it a support of value s0. We will prove that Algorithm 5 selects committee {c0, c1, · · · , ck−1}, and thus its
approximation ratio is 1/s0 = Hk − ε.
In the first round, we have that load(c0) = 1/s0 and load(cj) =
1
k+1−j for each j ≥ 1, so we add c1 to the
committee, which has load(c1) = 1/k = Hk − Hk−1, and update load(nj) ← Hk − Hk−1 for each j ≥ 1. More
generally, in the i-th round for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, we have that load(c0) = s0 and load(cj) =
1+(k+1−j)(Hk−Hk+1−i)
k+1−j =
1
k+1−j +Hk −Hk+1−i for each j ≥ i, so we add ci to the committee, which has load(ci) = Hk −Hk−i, and update
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s0 = 1/(H4 − ε)
s1 = 1
s2 = 1
s3 = 1
s4 = 1
n0
n1
n2
n3
n4
c0
c1
c2
c3
c4
Figure 3: Instance of maximin support where seqPhragmen gives an approximation ratio ofHk − ε, for k = 4.
load(nj) ← Hk − Hki for each j ≥ i. Finally, in the k-th round we have that load(c0) = 1/s0 = Hk − ε and
load(ck) = Hk, thus we elect c0 as the final committee member. This completes the proof.
C A lazy greedy algorithm
In this section we prove Theorem 13 and present LazyMMS (Algorithm 6), a variant of MMS (Algorithm 1) that is
faster by a factor Θ(k) and offers virtually the same approximation guarantee.
Data: Approval graphG = (N ∪ C,E), vector s of vote strengths, committee size k, threshold support t ≥ 0.
Initialize A = ∅, w = 0 ∈ RE≥0, and U = C // U is the set of “uninspected” candidates ;
while U 6= ∅ do
Find cmax ∈ argmaxc′∈U score(c
′) // try the uninspected candidate with highest score ;
Remove cmax from U ;
Compute a balanced edge weight vector w′ for A+ cmax;
if suppw′(A+ cmax) ≥ t then // candidate is “good enough” to add
Update A← A+ cmax and w ← w′ ;
if |A| = k then return (A,w);
end
end
return a failure message;
Algorithm 6: LazyMMS
AlgorithmLazyMMS is lazier thanMMS in the sense that for each candidate it inspects, it decides on the spot whether
to add it to the current partial solution, if the candidate is "good enough", or permanently reject it. In particular, each
inspected candidate entails the computation of a single balanced weight vector, as opposed to O(k) inMMS. Clearly,
in each of the O(|C|) iterations the complexity is dominated by this computation, which takes time Bal (the highest
score in U can be computed in time O(|E| log k) with a variant of AlgorithmMaxScore; see Theorem 15).
For a threshold t ≥ 0 given as input, the algorithm either succeeds and returns a full solution (A,w) with suppw(A) ≥
t, or it returns a failure message. The idea is then to run trials of LazyMMS over several input thresholds t, where
each trial executes in time O(Bal ·|C|), performing binary search to converge to a value of t where it flips from failure
to success, and return the output of the last successful trial. We start by proving that for low enough values of t, the
algorithm is guaranteed to succeed. We highlight that in the following proof the order in which the candidate set is
traversed (i.e. always selecting the uninspected candidate with highest score) is irrelevant.
Lemma 29. If (A∗, w∗) is an optimal solution to the given instance of maximin support, and t∗ = suppw∗(A∗), then
for any input threshold t with 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗/2, Algorithm LazyMMS is guaranteed to succeed.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that for some input threshold t ≤ t∗/2, LazyMMS fails. Thus, after traversing the
whole candidate set C, the algorithm ends up with a partial solution (A,w) with |A| < k and suppw(A) ≥ t. By
Lemma 12, there must be a candidate c′ ∈ A∗ \ A and a feasible solution (A + c′, w′) such that suppw′(A+ c′) ≥ t.
Notice as well that for any subset S of A+ c′, vectorw′ provides a support of at least t, so any balanced weight vector
for S also provides a support of at least t. This implies that at whichever point the algorithm inspected candidate c′, it
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should have included it in the partial solution, which at that time was a subset of A. Hence, c′ should be contained in
A, and we reach a contradiction.
In the next lemma we establish the number of trials needed to achieve a solution whose value is within a factor (2 + ε)
from optimal for any ε > 0.
Lemma 30. For any ε > 0,O(log(1/ε)) trials of LazyMMS are sufficient to obtain a solution whose maximin support
value is within a factor (2 + ε) from optimal.
Proof. First, we need to compute an α-factor estimation of the optimal objective value t∗. One way to do that is to
use the BalPhragmms algorithm (Section 4.2), which provides an approximation guarantee of α = 3.15 and runs in
time O(Bal ·k).7 If t is the objective value of its output, and we initialize the variables t′ ← t/2, t′′ ← α · t, then
we have the properties that t′ < t′′ and that LazyMMS succeeds for threshold t′ and fails for threshold t′′. We keep
these properties as loop invariants as we perform binary search over Algorithm LazyMMS, in each iteration setting
the new threshold value to the geometric mean of t′ and t′′. This way, the ratio t′′/t′ starts with a constant value 2α,
and is square-rooted in each iteration. By Lemma 29, to achieve a (2 + ε)-factor guarantee it suffices to find threshold
values t′ < t′′ such that LazyMMS succeeds for t′ and fails for t′′ and whose ratio is bounded by t′′/t′ ≤ 1 + ε/2,
and return the output for t′. If it takes T + 1 iterations for our binary search to bring this ratio below (1 + ε/2), then
(2α)1/2
T
> (1 + ε/2), so T = O(log(ε−1 log(α))) = O(log(ε−1)). This completes the proof.
Finally, we prove that whenever Algorithm LazyMMS succeeds and returns a full solution, this solution satisfies PJR.
For this, we exploit the order in which we inspected the candidates. This completes the proof of Theorem 13.
Lemma 31. For any input threshold t, at the end of each iteration of Algorithm LazyMMS we have that if (A,w) is
the current partial balanced solution, then suppw(A) ≥ maxc′∈C\A score(A,w)(c
′). Therefore, if threshold t is such
that the algorithm succeeds and returns a full solution, this solution satisfies PJR.
Proof. The second statement immediately follows from the first one together with Lemma 18, hence we focus on
proving the first statement. Fix an input threshold t and some iteration of LazyMMS, and let (A,w) be the partial
solution at the end of it. We consider three cases. Case 1: If all candidates inspected so far have been added to the
solution, then up to this point the construction coincides with Algorithm BalPhragmms, and the claim follows by
Lemma 19. Case 2: Suppose the last iteration was the first to reject a candidate, and let c′ be this candidate. Then, c′
has the highest score in C \ A, and we claim that this score must be below threshold t, and hence below suppw(A).
Otherwise, by Lemma 14 we have that Algorithm Insert(A,w, c′, t) could find a weight vector that gives A + c′ a
support above t, so a balanced weight vector would also give A + c′ a support above t which contradicts the fact that
c′ was rejected. Case 3: If a candidate was rejected in a previous iteration, then at the time of the first rejection we
had that the highest score in C \A was below t, and this inequality must continue to hold true by Lemma 17, because
scores can only decrease in future iterations. This completes the proof.
D Algorithmic considerations of the new heuristic
The goal of this section is threefold. First, we prove Theorem 15 and describe efficient algorithms related to the
Phragmms heuristic proposed in Section 4. Second, we compare it to seqPhragmen (Algorithm 5) and argue that
the new heuristic can be seen as a natural progression in terms of algorithmic complication. Finally, we improve the
runtime analysis of Algorithm BalPhragmms and show that each iteration can be executed in time O(Bal +|E|),
down from O(Bal+|E| · log k) as was proved in Section 4.2.
As we did in Section 4.1, we assume in the following that the election instance (G = (N ∪ C,E), s, k) is known and
does not need to be given as input. Instead, the input is a partial solution (A,w) with |A| ≤ k. The list of committee
member supports (suppw(c))c∈A is implicitly passed by reference and updated in every algorithm. We start with
Algorithm 7, which shows how to find the candidate with highest pre-score for a given threshold t.
Lemma 32. For a partial solution (A,w) and threshold t ≥ 0, MaxPrescore(A,w, t) executes in time O(|E|), and
returns a tuple (ct, pt) such that ct ∈ C \A and pt = prescore(ct, t) = maxc′∈C\A prescore(c
′, t).
Proof. The correctness of the algorithm directly follows from the definitions of slack and pre-score. The running time
is O(|E|) because each edge in the approval graphG = (N ∪V,E) is inspected at most once in each of the two loops.
The first loop also inspects each voter, but we have |N | = O(|E|) since we assume thatG has no isolated vertices.
7In fact, it can be checked that the BalPhragmms algorithm is equivalent to an execution of LazyMMS with threshold t = 0.
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Data: Partial solution (A,w), threshold t ≥ 0.
for each voter n ∈ N do compute slack(n, t) = sn −
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc ·min{1, t/suppw(c)} ;
for each candidate c′ ∈ C \A do compute prescore(c′, t) =
∑
n∈Nc′
slack(n, t) ;
Find a candidate ct ∈ argmaxc′∈C\A prescore(c
′, t);
return (ct, prescore(ct, t));
Algorithm 7:MaxPrescore(A,w, t)
For a fixed partial solution (A,w) and for each candidate c′ ∈ C\A, consider the function fc′(t) := prescore(c′, t)−t
in the interval [0,∞). Notice from the definition of pre-score (5) that this function is convex, continuous and strictly
decreasing with no lower bound, and that fc′(0) ≥ 0; hence it has a unique root which corresponds precisely to
score(c′). We could approximate this root via binary search – however, we can do better. Function fc′(t) is piece-
wise linear: if we sort the member supports {suppw(c) : c ∈ A} = {t1, · · · , tr} so that t1 < · · · < tr for some
r ≤ |A|, then fc′(t) is linear in each of the intervals [0, t1), [t1, t2), · · · , [tr,∞).
Similarly, function f(t) := maxc′∈C\A fc′(t) = maxc′∈C\A prescore(c
′, t)− t is continuous and strictly decreasing
in the interval [0,∞), with a unique root tmax = maxc′∈C\A score(c
′). Unfortunately, this function is in general not
linear within each of the intervals above.8 Still, it will be convenient to use binary search to identify the interval that
contains tmax. We do so in Algorithm 8. The next lemma follows from our exposition and its proof is skipped.
Data: Partial solution (A,w).
Sort the member supports to obtain 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tr, where {t1, · · · , tr} = {suppw(c) : c ∈ A};
if ptr ≥ tr where (ctr , ptr)← MaxPrescore(A,w, tr) then return tr;
Let jlo = 0, jhi = r − 1;
while jlo < jhi do
Let j = ⌈(jlo + jhi)/2⌉;
if ptj ≥ tj where (ctj , ptj )← MaxPrescore(A,w, tj) then Set jlo ← j else Set jhi ← j − 1;
end
return tjlo ;
Algorithm 8: FindInterval(A,w)
Lemma 33. For a partial solution (A,w), Algorithm FindInterval(A,w) makes O(log |A|) calls to MaxPrescore,
and thus runs in time O(|E| · log k). It returns a value t′ so that t′ ≤ tmax := maxc′∈C\A score(c
′), and for each
candidate c′ ∈ C \A, the value of prescore(c′, t) is linear in t within the interval [t′, tmax].
Once we have identified such a value t′, we exploit the fact that for each c′ ∈ C \A, function fc′(t) is linear inside the
interval [t′, tmax]. If we fix a candidate c
′ and linearize function fc′(t) by extending its linear behavior within [t
′, tmax]
onto the full domain [0,∞), and we denote its corresponding unique root by tc′ , then we have
0 = fc′(tc′)|linearized around [t′,tmax]
= prescore(c′, tc′)|linearized around [t′,tmax] − tc′
=
∑
n∈Nc′
slack(n, t)|linearized around [t′,tmax] − tc′
=
∑
n∈Nc′
(
sn −
∑
c∈A∩Cn: suppw(c)<t′
wnc −
∑
c∈A∩Cn: suppw(c)≥t′
wnc · tc′/suppw(c)
)
− tc′ ,
where we used the definitions of pre-score and slack. Solving for tc′ , we obtain
tc′ =
∑
n∈Nc′
(
sn −
∑
c∈A∩Cn: suppw(c)<t′
wnc
)
1 +
∑
n∈Nc′
∑
c∈A∩Cn: suppw(c)≥t′
wnc
suppw(c)
=: linscore(A,w)(c
′, t′).
Notice that the expression above depends only on t′ and not on tmax. Replacing t
′ by x in the expression above, we
define the linearized score of c′ around point x (denoted by linscore(A,w)(c
′, x) and shortened to linscore(c′, t′))
8In each of these O(k) intervals, function f(t) is piece-wise linear with O(|C|) pieces. We could thus find the root of f(t) via
binary search by performing O(log k + log |C|) calls toMaxPrescore. However, our approach only requires O(log k) such calls.
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for each candidate c′ ∈ C \ A and each x ≥ 0. Since fc′(t) is a convex decreasing function over [0,∞) and its
linearization around x is a straight line tangential to it (meeting at point x), then the root of this linearization must fall
to the left of its own root, i.e. it holds that
linscore(c′, x) ≤ score(c′) for each c′ ∈ C \A and each x ≥ 0.
On the other hand, for the candidate cmax with highest score tmax, and for x = t
′ as in Lemma 33, these two roots
must coincide, i.e. tmax = score(cmax) = linscore(cmax, t
′). Consequently, cmax also has the highest linearized
score around t′ among all candidates in C \A, and we can exploit this fact to find it. We formalize these observations
in Algorithm 9 and the lemma below.
Data: Partial solution (A,w).
Let t′ ← FindInterval(A,w);
for each voter n ∈ N do
Compute pn := sn −
∑
c∈A∩Cn: suppw(c)<t′
wnc;
Compute qn :=
∑
c∈A∩Cn: suppw(c)≥t′
wnc/suppw(c);
end
for each candidate c′ ∈ C \A do compute linscore(c′, t′) =
∑
n∈N
c′
pn
1+
∑
n∈N
c′
qn
;
Find a candidate cmax ∈ argmaxc′∈C\A linscore(c
′, t′);
return (cmax, linscore(cmax, t
′));
Algorithm 9:MaxScore(A,w)
Lemma 34. For a partial solution (A,w), AlgorithmMaxScore(A,w) runs in time O(|E| · log k) and returns a tuple
(cmax, tmax) such that tmax = score(cmax) = maxc′∈C\A score(c
′).
Proof. The correctness of the algorithm follows from the definition of linearized score and the arguments above. Each
of the for loops executes in time O(|E|) because in each one of them each edge is examined at most once. Thus, the
running time is dominated by the call to function FindInterval(A,w), which takes time O(|E| · log k).
This completes the proof of Theorem 15. We highlight again that an iteration of the Phragmms executes in time
O(|E| · log k), almost matching the complexity of seqPhragmen which is O(|E|) time per iteration.
Next, we discuss the similarities and differences between the Phragmms and seqPhragmen heuristics. To this end,
consider an execution of Phragmms in the case that the input partial solution (A,w) is balanced. In this case, by
point 3 of Lemma 4, for each voter n ∈ N and each member c ∈ A ∩ Cn such that wnc > 0 it must hold that
suppw(c) = suppw(A ∩ Cn). If we then compute the linearized score of a candidate c′ ∈ C \ A around the origin
(setting x = 0) we obtain
linscore(c′, 0) =
∑
n∈Nc′
sn
1 +
∑
n∈Nc′
1
suppw(A∩Cn)
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc
=
∑
n∈Nc′
sn
1 +
∑
n∈Nc′
sn
suppw(A∩Cn)
,
where in the second line we used the fact that
∑
c∈A∩Cn
wnc = sn must hold for each voter n for which A ∩Cn 6= ∅,
by point 2 of Lemma 4 (if A ∩ Cn = ∅ then suppw(A ∩ Cn) = ∞ by convention and the corresponding term in
the denominator vanishes). This linearized score corresponds precisely to the inverse of the candidate load function
being minimized in the seqPhragmen heuristic (see Algorithm 5), with a corresponding voter load function set to the
inverse of suppw(A ∩ Cn). Therefore, the two heuristics coincide in the specific case that the input partial solution is
balanced and the linearized score around the origin is used. Put differently, we can say that the new heuristic provides
two main advantages: First, by using edge weights it defines a more robust notion of loads, which enables it to deal
with an arbitrary input partial solution without any guarantees on how it was constructed. Second, by considering
further linearizations of the pre-score function it grants new candidates higher scores and thus adds them with higher
supports.
Finally, we reconsider the complexity of BalPhragmms (Algorithm 3). At the start of each iteration with current
partial solution (A,w), notice by Lemma 19 that the highest score tmax must be lower than the least member support
t1 = suppw(A). So, tmax lies in the interval [0, t1], and we can skip the computation of AlgorithmFindInterval(A,w)
as we know that it would return t′ = 0. Without this computation, MaxScore(A,w) (Algorithm 9) runs in time
22
A PREPRINT - JULY 28, 2020
O(|E|), so the runtime of a full iteration of BalPhragmms can be performed in time O(Bal+|E|), down from
O(Bal+|E| · log k) as was established in Section 4.2.
E Delayed proofs
Lemma 35. Let w ∈ RE≥0 be a feasible weight vector for a given instance, let c, c
′ ∈ C be two candidates with
suppw(c) > suppw(c
′), and suppose there is a path p ∈ RE that carries some non-zero flow from c to c′, with zero
excess elsewhere. If w + p is non-negative and feasible, then w is not balanced for any committee A that contains c′.
Proof. Fix a committeeA ⊆ C that contains c′. If c is not inA, thenw+p provides a greater sum of member supports
over A than w, so the latter is not balanced as it does not maximize this sum. Now suppose both c and c′ are in A.
Let λ > 0 be the flow value carried by p, let ε := min{λ, (suppw(c) − suppw(c′))/2} > 0, and let p′ be the scalar
multiple of p whose flow value is ε. By an application of Lemma 7 over w and w′ := w + p, and the fact that p′ is
a sub-flow of p = w′ − w, we have that w + p′ is non-negative and feasible. Moreover, both w and w + p′ clearly
provide the same sum of member supports overA. Finally, if we compare their sums of member supports squared, we
have that∑
d∈A
supp2w(d)−
∑
d∈A
supp2w+p′(d) = supp
2
w(c) + supp
2
w(c
′)− supp2w+p′(c)− supp
2
w+p′(c
′)
= supp2w(c) + supp
2
w(c
′)− (suppw(c)− ε)
2 − (suppw(c) + ε)
2
= 2ε · (suppw(c)− suppw(c
′)− ε) ≥ 2ε · (2ε− ε) = 2ε2 > 0.
Therefore, w is not balanced for A, as it does not minimize the sum of member supports squared.
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix a balanced partial solution (A,w). The first statement says that function Fr(w′) :=
minA′⊆A,|A′|=r
∑
c∈A′ suppw′(c) is maximized by vector w over all feasible vectors w
′ ∈ RE≥0, for all 1 ≤ r ≤ |A|.
Assume by contradiction that there is a parameter r and feasible w′ such that Fr(w
′) > Fr(w). We can also assume
without loss of generality that
1.
∑
c∈A suppw′(c) =
∑
c∈A suppw(c), i.e. w
′ also maximizes the sum of member supports, as does w by
definition of balancedness; and
2. we enumerate the candidates in A = {c1, · · · , c|A|} so that whenever i < j we have that suppw(ci) ≤
suppw(cj), and in case of a tie, suppw(ci) = suppw(cj), we have that suppw′(ci) ≤ suppw′(cj).
With a candidate enumeration as above, it follows that Fr(w) =
∑r
i=1 suppw(ci), while for vector w
′ we have the
inequality Fr(w
′) ≤
∑r
i=1 suppw′(ci). Thus, by our assumption by contradiction,
r∑
i=1
suppw′(ci) ≥ Fr(w
′) > Fr(w) =
r∑
i=1
suppw(ci), and
|A|∑
i=r+1
suppw′(ci) =
|A|∑
i=1
suppw′(ci)−
r∑
i=1
suppw′(ci)
=
|A|∑
i=1
suppw(ci)−
r∑
i=1
suppw′(ci)
<
|A|∑
i=1
suppw(ci)−
r∑
i=1
suppw(ci) =
|A|∑
i=r+1
suppw(ci).
Now define the edge vector f := w′ − w ∈ RE and consider it as a flow over the network (N ∪ A,E). We have
that f has a zero net demand over set N , by our first assumption, and the previous two inequalities show that f has
a positive net demand over set {c1, · · · , cr} and a positive net excess over set {cr+1, · · · , c|A|}. Thus, by the flow
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decomposition theorem, f can be decomposed into circulations and simple paths, where every path starts in a vertex
with positive demand and ends in a vertex with positive excess, and there must be a simple path p carrying non-zero
flow from cj to ci for some 1 ≤ i ≤ r < j ≤ |A|. Moreover, by our second assumption, it must be the case that
suppw(ci) < suppw(cj), because in case of a tie we would have that suppw′(ci) < suppw′(cj) and so f would have
a net excess on ci and net demand on cj , and the ci-to-cj path would not exist in the flow decomposition. But now,
by Lemma 7, vector w + p is non-negative and feasible, and by Lemma 35, w is not balanced for A, and we reach a
contradiction.
The second statement follows directly from the fact that w maximizes the sum of member supports, and thus all of the
vote strength of all represented voters (i.e. all voters in ∪c∈ANc) must be directed to members of A. We move on to
the third statement. Assume by contradiction that there is a voter n ∈ N and two candidates c, c′ ∈ A ∩ Cn such that
wnc > 0 and suppw(c) > suppw(c
′). Let ε := min{wnc, (suppw(c)−suppw(c′))/2} > 0, and define a path p ∈ RE
carrying flow ε from c to c′ via n, i.e pnc′ = −pnc = ε and pe = 0 for every other edge e ∈ E. It can be checked that
w + p is non-negative and feasible, so by Lemma 35 w is not balanced for A, which is a contradiction.
Finally, we prove that if a feasible weight vector satisfies conditions 2 and 3, then it is balanced forA. In fact, we claim
that all such weight vectors provide the same list of member supports (suppw(c))c∈A, and hence are all balanced. Let
w,w′ ∈ RE≥0 be two such weight vectors. It easily follows from feasibility (inequality 2) and condition 2 that both
provide the same sum of member supports, namely
∑
c∈A suppw(c) =
∑
c∈A suppw′(c) =
∑
n∈∪c∈ANc
sn. Now,
assume by contradiction and wlog that there is a candidate c ∈ A for which suppw(c) > suppw′(c), and consider
the flow vector f := w′ − w over the network induced by N ∪ A. Clearly, all nodes in N have zero excess, while
c has positive excess. By the flow decomposition theorem, f can be decomposed into circulations and single paths,
where every path starts in a node with net excess and ends in a node with net demand; so, there must be non-zero
path p that starts in c and ends in a candidate c′ ∈ A with net demand. Now, path p alternates between candidates
and voters, and there must be three consecutive nodes c1, n, c2 in it, with c1, c2 ∈ A ∩ Cn, such that c1 has positive
excess and c2 does not, i.e. suppw′(c1) < suppw(c2) and suppw′(c2) ≥ suppw(c2), which in turn implies that
either suppw′(c1) < suppw′(c2) or suppw(c2) < suppw(c1) (or both). If suppw′(c1) < suppw′(c2), we reach a
contradiction to the fact that w′ satisfies condition 3 and that w′nc2 must be positive since the flow in p moves from n
to c2; and similarly if suppw(c2) < suppw(c1) we reach a contradiction to the fact that w satisfies condition 3 and
that wnc1 must be positive since the flow in p moves from c1 to n. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let A′ ⊆ A be the non-empty subset that minimizes the expression 1|A′|
∑
n∈∪c∈A′Nc
sn. Hence,
suppw(A) ≤ suppw(A
′) ≤
1
|A′|
∑
c∈A′
suppw(c) (by an averaging argument)
=
1
|A′|
∑
c∈A′
∑
n∈Nc
wnc ≤
1
|A′|
∑
n∈∪c∈A′Nc
∑
c∈Cn
wnc
≤
1
|A′|
∑
n∈∪c∈A′Nc
sn (by 2).
This proves one inequality. To prove the opposite inequality, we use the fact that (A,w) is a balanced solution. Let
Amin ⊆ A be the set of committee members with least support, i.e. those c ∈ A with suppw(c) = suppw(A). Then,
suppw(Amin) =
1
|Amin|
∑
c∈Amin
suppw(c)
=
1
|Amin|
∑
c∈Amin
∑
n∈Nc
wnc =
1
|Amin|
∑
n∈∪c∈AminNc
∑
c∈Cn∩Amin
wnc
=
1
|Amin|
∑
n∈∪c∈AminNc
( ∑
c∈Cn∩A
wnc −
∑
c∈Cn∩(A\Amin)
wnc
)
=
1
|Amin|
∑
n∈∪c∈AminNc
sn ≥ min
∅6=A′⊆A
1
|A′|
∑
n∈∪c∈A′Nc
sn,
where we used the fact that for each voter n ∈ ∪c∈AminNc, the term
∑
c∈Cn∩A
wnc equals sn by point 2 of Lemma 4,
and the term
∑
c∈Cn∩(A\Amin)
wnc vanishes by point 3 of Lemma 4 and the definition of set Amin. This proves the
second inequality and completes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 7. We prove the claim only for w + f ′, as the proof for w′ − f ′ is similar. For each edge e ∈ E, we
have that (w + f ′)e is a value between we and (w + f)e = w
′
e. As both of these values are non-negative, the same
holds for (w + f ′)e. Notice now from inequality (2) that proving feasibility corresponds to proving that the excess
(w + f ′)(n) is at most sn for each voter n ∈ N . We have
(w + f ′)(n) =
∑
c∈Cn
(w + f ′)nc =
∑
c∈Cn
wnc +
∑
c∈Cn
f ′nc = w(n) + f
′(n).
If excess f ′(n) is non-positive, then (w + f ′)(n) ≤ w(n) ≤ sn, since w is feasible. Otherwise, f ′(n) ≤ f(n), and
thus (w + f ′)(n) ≤ w(n) + f(n) = (w + f)(n) = w′(n) ≤ sn, since w
′ is feasible. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 17. The second statement follows directly from the first one and the definitions of slack, pre-score
and score in Section 4. Hence we focus on the first statement, i.e. that suppw(c) ≥ suppw′(c) for each candidate
c ∈ A.
Consider vector f := w′−w ∈ RE as a flow vector over the network induced byN ∪A′. We need to prove that there
is no candidate in A with positive demand relative to f . Assume by contradiction that there is such a candidate c′ ∈ A.
By the flow decomposition theorem, f can be decomposed into circulations and simple paths, where each path starts
in a vertex with positive excess and ends in a vertex with positive demand. By our assumption, there must be a path
p carrying non-zero flow to c′. Now, where does path p start? It cannot start in N nor in A′ \ A, as otherwise weight
vector w + p is feasible by Lemma 7, and has a greater sum of candidate supports over A than w, which contradicts
the fact that w is balanced forA and thus maximizes this sum. Therefore, it must start in another candidate c inA with
positive excess. The fact that f has positive excess in c and positive demand in c′ implies that
suppw(c
′)− suppw′(c
′) = f(c′) < 0 < f(c) = suppw(c)− suppw′(c),
which in turn implies that either suppw(c) > suppw(c
′) or suppw′(c
′) > suppw′(c), or both. If suppw(c) >
suppw(c
′), then Lemma 35 implies that w is not balanced for A. Similarly, if suppw′(c
′) > suppw′(c), notice that
w′−p is non-negative and balanced by Lemma 7, so again Lemma 35 applied over vectorw′ and path−p implies that
w′ is not balanced for A′. Hence, in either case we reach a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 22. Recall that for any set A ⊆ R, the indicator function 1A : R → R is defined as 1A(t) = 1 if
t ∈ A, and 0 otherwise. For any i ∈ I , we can write
αif(xi) = αi
∫ f(xi)
0
dt = αi
∫ limx→∞ f(x)
0
1(−∞,f(xi)](t)dt,
and thus
∑
i∈I
αif(xi) =
∫ limx→∞ f(x)
0
(∑
i∈I
αi1(−∞,f(xi)](t)
)
dt =
∫ limx→∞ f(x)
0
( ∑
i∈I: f(xi)≥t
αi
)
dt.
This is a Lebesgue integral over the measure with weights αi. Now, conditions on function f(x) are sufficient for its
inverse f−1(t) to exist, with f−1(0) = χ. Substituting with the new variable x = f−1(t) on the formula above, where
t = f(x) and dt = f ′(x)dx, we finally obtain
∑
i∈I
αif(xi) =
∫ ∞
χ
( ∑
i∈I: xi≥x
αi
)
(f ′(x)dx).
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